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ABSTRACT
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are used by millions of users
worldwide. Academically speaking, there is little doubt about
the usefulness of demographic studies conducted on OSNs
and, hence, methods to label unknown users from small la-
beled samples are very useful. However, from the general
public point of view, this can be a serious privacy concern.
Thus, both topics are tackled in this paper: First, a new
algorithm to perform user profiling in social networks is de-
scribed, and its performance is reported and discussed. Sec-
ondly, the experiments –conducted on information usually
considered sensitive– reveal that by just publicizing one’s
contacts privacy is at risk and, thus, measures to minimize
privacy leaks due to social graph data mining are outlined.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
G.2.2 [Discrete Mathematics]: Graph Theory—Graph al-
gorithms,Graph labeling ; I.5.2 [Pattern Recognition]: De-
sign Methodology—Classifier design and evaluation; K.4.1
[Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation, Human Factors, Legal As-
pects
Keywords
Online Social Networks, Twitter, graph labeling, privacy
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Graph Labeling is the task of assigning labels to the ver-
tices or edges of a graph. Because social networks are usually
represented as graphs, vertex and edge labeling algorithms
can be applied to them straightforwardly. In the former case
the individuals in the network are labeled, while in the later
the labels are assigned to the relationships between them.
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In that context, labeling algorithms can exploit a property
of social networks: the tendency of people to relate more
likely with those sharing similar traits, or homophily. This
phenomenon is pervasive to very different social networks,
and it has been revealed that a number of personal charac-
teristics –such as race and ethnicity, age, religion, education,
occupation, or sex– induce homophilous relationships [13].
Thereby, homophily can be used both to cluster similar
individuals within a network, or to infer attribute values for
every individual from his neighbors’ characteristics. In the
first case –community detection– it is not necessary to know
anything about the members of the social network except
for their relations. In the second, the attributes of interest
are needed and, hence, part of the individuals in the network
must have known values for them –i.e. they must be labeled.
Thus, from a machine learning perspective, the first is an
unsupervised problem while the second is semi-supervised.
It is well-known that online social networks (OSNs) ask
their users for personal information and that many of those
users happily provide it. Hence, part of the users in OSNs
are labeled and semi-supervised approaches can be employed
to label the rest of the members of the network.
This paper describes a new semi-supervised algorithm to
perform user profiling in social networks. A number of ex-
periments conducted on Twitter data are reported, and the
privacy implications discussed. Certainly, there exist a num-
ber of semi-supervised methods to label partially labeled so-
cial graphs. Hence, a later section reviews those most highly
related to the method here proposed, and points out the
main differences between this and them. Moreover, previ-
ous works regarding the privacy implications of social graph
mining are also discussed. In that sense, this paper focuses
on active measures the users can adopt and, thus, it outlines
a protocol to minimize leakages due to graph data mining.
2. THE McC-SPLAT ALGORITHM
McC-Splat1 is an iterative algorithm to perform vertex
labeling on a partially labeled social network. It is a mul-
ticlass classifier, that is, each attribute can have more than
two classes and, in fact, in addition to the predefined at-
tribute values –e.g. female and male for sex– an extra class,
unknown, is also required for each attribute.
Needless to say, individuals have a number of different
attributes –e.g. sex, age, or marital status– and, hence, each
1Mnemonic for Multiclass Classification using Soft Labeling
Propagation and Automatic Thresholding.
person would have got a profile comprising such attributes
with their corresponding values. The McC-Splat algorithm
can simultaneously propagate the values for each attribute
in the users’ profiles but, for the sake of clarity, the following
description just covers the single attribute case.
McC-Splat works on a directed graph G = {V,E,C,A}
where V is the set of vertices –i.e. individuals, E denotes
the edges –i.e. relationships between those individuals, C =
{c1, . . . , cm} are the different classes each individual’s at-
tribute can take, and finally A is the set of attribute weight
vectors for the individuals in V .
By using attribute weight vectors it would be possible to
model overlapping classes; nevertheless, all of the experi-
ments reported here were conducted with disjoint classes.
Moreover, the weights can be seen as a proxy for the user’s
likelihood to belong to a given class –including the unknown
one– although weights are not probabilities in a strict sense.
The following formalization describes the A set:
A ⊂ [0, 1]m+1 |m = |C| ,∀a ∈ A : |a| = 1
Given that G is partially labeled, V is divided in two dis-
joint sets: the set V K of known vertices –i.e. those individu-
als with a known class value for the attribute– and the set of
unknown vertices V U –i.e those belonging to the unknown
class. Because the attribute values can be taken from m
different classes this can be formalized as:
V = V K + V U
V K = {vi ∈ V |∃j : 1 6 j 6 m,aij = 1}
V U = {vi ∈ V |¬∃j : 1 6 j 6 m,aij = 1}
Finally, a definition for the neighborhood of each vertex
is needed. In this regard it must be noted that (1) this
algorithm assumes directed graphs, and (2) it only considers
as neighbors of a person those people related to the first one
via a relationship started by that person.
For instance, in a phone network those numbers a user
makes calls to would be neighbors, but not the numbers from
which he receives calls; in the blogosphere the neighborhood
would comprise the blogs a given blog links to, but not those
linking to that blog; in Twitter the neighbors would be those
users a given user is following, but not his followers.
Thereby, the neighborhood for vertex vi ∈ V would be:
Ni = {vj ∈ V |∃eij ∈ E}
All of this defines the input graph but not the way in
which the algorithm works on it. As it has been said, it
is an iterative algorithm and, hence, at its core there is an
operation to compute new weights for each vertex attribute
vector from its neighbors weights in the previous iteration.
It must be noted that only the weights for vertices belonging
to V U are updated, those from the originally labeled set V K
are not assigned new weights:
∀vi ∈ V
U : a
(t)
i =
1
Z
∑
vj∈Ni
a
(t−1)
j
∀vi ∈ V
K : ai
(t) = ai
(0)
In the previous formalization Z is a normalizer.
McC-Splat, like other graph iterative algorithms, converges
after relatively few iterations. Hence, once weight vectors
have stabilized –or after a predefined number of iterations–
a large part of vertices in V U have got weight vectors for the
attribute of interest. Other algorithms would then assign to
each vertex the label with the highest weight within the vec-
tor, or would require an ad hoc threshold to be defined for
each class value. McC-Splat, instead, introduces two extra
steps which can be used to achieve automatic thresholding
in a number of ways.
First of all, a fictitious sink vertex can be introduced. Such
a vertex would represent an individual related to every sin-
gle person within the social network. The weights for that
vertex are computed after the last iteration and they pro-
vide a measure of which weights could be expected for a
user without homophilous relationships. The usefulness of
such an approach is clear when a large majority of people
belongs to a single class; if that prevalence is not taken into
account most of the unknown individuals would be incor-
rectly assigned to the majority class. This equation defines
the weight vector for such a sink vertex:
s(T+1) = 1
Z
∑
vi∈V
a
(T )
i
Once the sink vertex weights are computed they can be
used in two ways: (1) vertices from V U can be assigned
the label with the highest weight which is also above the
corresponding weight in the sink vector; or (2) vertices from
V U can be assigned the label with the weight which most
largely departs –in percentage value– from the corresponding
weight in the sink vector.
The second approach to automatic thresholding requires
to compute an alternative weight vector for the members of
V K . As it has been said, those vertices’ vectors have got
one single component with a unity value –i.e. the compo-
nent corresponding to the class each individual belongs to–
and their vectors are not modified as the algorithm iterates.
However, it is possible to compute from their corresponding
neighborhoods the weights they would have whether they
had belonged to V U :
∀vi ∈ V
K : a′
(T+1)
i =
1
Z
∑
vj∈Ni
a
(T )
j
By doing that it is possible to produce a reverse-ordered
ranking of individuals for each of the class values the at-
tribute can take. That way, instead of defining an ad hoc
threshold to decide if a weight is high enough to accept the
induced label, it is possible to find different weights at dif-
ferent percentile values.
Thereby, when usingMcC-Splat it is not needed to take ad
hoc weight thresholds; instead, the confidence required from
the labeled output can be chosen. For instance, by choosing
the 90th percentile only those members of V U whose weights
were above 90% of the weights of V K members would appear
in the output labeled set.
So, in short, McC-Splat comes in the following flavors:
(1) Plain-vanilla, the class with the highest weight is as-
signed2. (2) Sink-absolute, the class with the highest weight
2The unknown class is ignored, otherwise all of the vertices
would remain unknown unless the number of labeled exam-
ples surpassed the number of unknown vertices.
and above the corresponding weight within the sink node is
assigned. (3) Sink-relative, the class with the highest positive
difference against the corresponding weight within the sink
node is assigned. (4) Percentile, the class with the highest
percentile –according to the labeled individuals– is assigned.
Optionally, a minimum value –e.g. 90%– can be forced or,
otherwise, the unknown class is assigned.
Now, the algorithm’s name should be self-explained: it
is a multiclass classifier which iteratively propagates weight
vectors to every node from its neighborhood; because each
node’s vector roughly represent its likelihood of belonging to
each class, the labeling is performed in a“soft” rather than in
a “hard” way; moreover, the algorithm provides alternatives
to automatically determine the most reliable class for each
node, making ad hoc thresholds unnecessary.
3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
3.1 Dataset Description
Social network data was needed to test the performance
of McC-Splat. The graph depicting relationships between
individuals was essential but, in addition to that, a part of
those users had to be labeled.
Hence, the Twitter3 dataset collected in [2] was used. It
comprises 27.9 million English-written tweets published from
January 26 to August 31, 2009 by 4.98 million users.
Followers and followees for each of the users in that dataset
were also collected. Links to users not appearing in the
dataset were disregarded, and isolated users were removed.
Furthermore, a substantial amount of user accounts were
suspended at the moment of the graph crawl and, hence, no
information on them was available. Lastly, because of the
unavoidable network problems, coupled with the fact that
the API was pushed a little too far, the information for a
noticeable amount of users was not eventually crawled.
Thus, the user graph consisted of 1.8 million users with
their corresponding links and profiles –i.e. full name, short
biography, location, etc. Given that at the moment of col-
lecting the dataset, the number of Twitter users in the U.S.
was estimated between 14 and 18 millions4, and that most
of the crawled users were supposed to be from the U.S. it
can be considered a rather substantial sample.
3.2 Labeling Twitter users
Unlike other OSNs such as Facebook, Twitter profiles do
not provide highly structured information; there is no way,
for instance, to indicate the user’s sex or age. Instead, Twit-
ter profiles consist of the user’s full name, location, website,
and a short biography. All of these fields are free text and
there is a high disparity in their use. For example, 62.31% of
the users in the dataset provide a location string, but only
36.46% provide their full personal name [2].
This does not mean that no personal information can be
extracted from Twitter profiles. Quite to the contrary, using
3Twitter is a microblogging and social networking service.
Users publish short text messages (tweets) which are shown
to all of their followers. Relationships in Twitter are asym-
metrical and, thus, a user has got followers and followees.
4http://www.socialtimes.com/2009/04/twitter-14-
million/, http://mashable.com/2009/09/14/twitter-
2009-stats/
the location, full name, and biography strings, half of the
users in the dataset were geolocated, the sex of one third
of them was found, in addition to the age for about 11,000
[2]. Needless to say, the data was noisy, and the labeling
methods a bit rough; though, anecdotal evidence revealed a
quite accurate big-picture of Twitter demographics.
Therefore, a similar approach was employed to label users
according to a number of personal traits. In addition to sex
and age, the following attributes5 were also chosen: political
orientation, religious affiliation, race and ethnicity, and sex-
ual orientation. All of them are usually considered sensitive
information, and most countries have enacted laws against
discrimination based on any of such attributes. In spite of
this, many people still feel the need to hide those personal
details. Thus, it is important to find out the degree in which
such individuals can be inadvertently exposed because of
their acquaintances.
All of the classes, except those corresponding to sex, were
determined by means of pattern matching (see table 1 for
the patterns applied). Firstly, each class name was used to
obtain a initial list of users. For instance, the patterns demo-
crat* and republican* were used to find users self-defined
as Democrats or Republicans. Once there was a preliminary
list of users for each class, their biographies were mined to
find the most frequent keywords which could be considered
indicative of class belonging. That way, for example, pat-
terns such as lib-dem* or dems* were found for Democrats,
and conservat* or tea party for Republicans.
Certainly, such a labeling method is error prone but the
goal was to obtain the largest6 possible labeled set for each
class and attribute. Because of the nature of McC-Splat, it
was assumed that large although noisy data was preferable
to cleaner but small samples. After all, should the results be
encouraging, better labeling approaches could be used.
Finally, the labeled sets were split into training and tests
partitions: the former consisted of a random selection of
80% of the users in each class and was used as input for
the algorithm; the later comprised the remaining 20% of the
users and was left out for evaluation.
3.3 Results
McC-Splat was applied to the Twitter graph in each of its
four different “flavors” just considering the users in the train-
ing partitions. That way, labels were obtained for the rest
of the users in the graph including those in the test parti-
tions. Then, by comparing the algorithm’s class assignments
for those users with the actual class belonging according to
their biographies, precision and recall figures were computed
(see table 4). For comparison purposes, the performance of
a random classifier based on the proportion of each of the
different classes is shown in table 2.
In addition to that first experiment, a second one was
conducted on another independently labeled set. To that
end, data was collected from WeFollow7 which is a Twitter
5All of the chosen attributes, except for race/ethnicity, ap-
pear in Facebook profiles and, thus, it would not be surpris-
ing to find information on them in Twitter biographies.
6Table 1 reveals that the number of labeled examples ob-
tained was rather low for all of the attributes and, unsur-
prisingly, the more sensitive the attribute, the fewer users
disclose information about it in their biographies.
7http://wefollow.com
Table 1: Classes for each of the six personal attributes along the rules applied to label Twitter users according
to them. All of the labels, except for sex were obtained by pattern-matching the users’ biographies. The age
intervals were those used by [5].
Attribute Class Rule or pattern # users
sex
female User name had to be composed of first and last name from the U.S.
Census. Sex was assigned according to frequency of use of the first
name in U.S. population.
271,539
male 384,574
age
teenage
Age was extracted from the user’s bio looking for the patterns
year-old or years old preceded by a number or a numeral. Then,
ages <18, 18-24, 25-34, 35-49, and >49 were assigned to each class.
3,483
youngster 4,562
young 1,911
mid-age 663
elder 296
political orientation
democrat democrat*, lib-dem*, libdem*, dems* 248
republican
conservat*, gop, g.o.p., palin, pro-life*, prolife*, republican*,
right-wing, rightish, tcot, tea-party, teaparty
2,040
religious affiliation
atheist
agnost*, anti-theis*, antitheis*, ateus, atheis*, athiest*, empiricist*,
godless*, heathen*, humanism*, humanist*, irreligion*,
non-believer*, non-theist*, nonbeliever*, nontheist*, pagan*,
rational*, sceptic*, secular*, skepchicks, skeptic*
330
buddhist
buddh*, dhamma*, dharma*, sangha, twangha, vipassana, yoga*,
yoginis, yogis, zen
204
christian
adventist*, anglican*, baptist*, cathol*, cattolici, christ*, church*,
evangelical, gospel*, jesus*, lutheran*, methodist*, minister*,
ministries*, ministry*, pastor*, pentecostal*, preacher*,
presbyterian*, priest*
8,103
jewish
circumcision, israel*, jerusalem, jew, jewish, jews, judaism, jude,
kosher, rabbi, sephardic, synagogue*, torah, yiddish, zion*
458
muslim
imam, islam*, isulamic*, mosque*, muslim*, quran, salaam,
tweeplims
171
race/ethnicity
asian-american
asian*, chinese-american, filipin*, hindu*, india, indian-american,
japan, japanese-american, korea*, taoism, vietnam*
65
black
africa*, black, black-american, black-man, black-woman, hip-hop*,
hiphop*
202
hispanic
amigo, belleza, familia, favoritos, gente, hispanic, latina, latino,
mexico
6
native-american
aboriginal, alaska-native, american-indian, first-nation, firstnation,
indigenous*, native american, native-american
80
native-hawaiian
aloha, hawaii*, honolulu, native hawaiian, native-hawaiian, oahu,
ohana
4
white caucasian, white, white-american, white-man, white-woman 24
sexual orientation
heterosexual hetero* 15
homosexual
bisexual*, gay*, glbt, glsen, gltb, homo-*, homosex*, l-word,
lesbian*, lgbt, lgbtq, marriage-equality, queer, transgender
1,471
user directory where users classify themselves according to
the topics they are interested in. Each topic is represented by
a tag, and a list of users following each tag can be obtained8.
Hence, most of the patterns from table 1 were employed
to obtain lists of users from WeFollow9. Needless to say,
not every user in those lists appeared in the Twitter user
graph and, therefore, those users not appearing in the graph,
in addition to those already labeled –i.e. appearing in the
training and test partitions– were removed.
Performance results on this second dataset for both the
random classifier and the McC-Splat algorithm can be seen
in tables 3 and 5, respectively.
3.4 Discussion of Results
As it can be seen from tables 4 and 5 the performance of
McC-Splat was notably high. Average precision and accu-
racy figures were quite similar, implying that performance
across classes within the same attribute is comparable and,
thus, there was no much bias towards the prevalent classes.
Attributes such as religious affiliation, political orienta-
tion, sexual orientation, and race and ethnicity achieved
above 95% precision when evaluating on the test partitions.
Results in the WeFollow dataset were very similar, except for
race/ethnicity where precision dropped to 50% and accuracy
to 71%.
The poorest results were achieved when assigning sex and
age: 62% and 43% macro-averaged precision, respectively.
With regards to age, maybe it was problematic because it
is actually a continuous variable. After reviewing the ac-
tual classifications it was found that most of the errors were
due to assigning users to nearby classes –e.g. classifying
teenagers as youngsters, youngsters as youngs, etc.
All in all, McC-Splat clearly outperformed the random
classifier by an exceedingly large margin although, certainly,
when an attribute has got a clearly prevalent class it is much
more difficult to outperform it. In the presence of such preva-
lent classes the random classifier achieved good accuracy but
also poor macro-averaged precision; McC-Splat, instead, was
not very affected by such prevalent classes and it exhibited
comparable precision across classes.
Regarding the different “flavors”, the Plain-vanilla version
did not outperform the random classifier for prevalent classes
(e.g. male vs female, young vs the rest of age intervals,
and christians vs the rest of religious affiliations), and it
even underperformed when classifying homosexual individu-
als. The rest of the “flavors” clearly outperformed the ran-
dom classifier –even for prevalent classes– and they consis-
tently achieved high performance figures. Therefore, Plain-
vanilla could be disregarded and additional experiments are
required to find which of the other three alternatives can
be the best choice. In this regard, better labeled data –in
particular for large majority classes– is also needed.
4. RELATED WORK
As it has been said, McC-Splat is a semi-supervised graph
8For instance, http://wefollow.com/twitter/democrat
gives access to a list of users self-defined as Democrat, while
http://wefollow.com/twitter/republican provides a list
of Republican users.
9Sex and age were not able to be tested with data from
WeFollow.
labeling algorithm based on label propagation. There are
other algorithms which are somewhat similar and, hence,
those most highly related are to be briefly reviewed.
Maybe the best known iterative graph algorithm is PageR-
ank [15], it computes for each vertex –generally a web page–
a score which corresponds to its relevance within the net-
work. Its popularity has spurred the use of similar methods
in many other scenarios –e.g. to fight spam in the Web [4].
With regards to the use of the graph structure to per-
form classification, one of the earliest works was a hypertext
classifier [1]. In this case, however, the links were used to
improve the classifier but other clues –such as the documents
content– were also required.
Much more related to McC-Splat are the works described
in [11, 14]. In [14] it is described an iterative application of
Bayesian classifiers where the objects attributes were mod-
ified from the inferences made on their neighbors in each
iteration. In [11] the so-called wvRN10 method is described.
That algorithm works on undirected weighted graphs and
just relies on the objects labels and relationships. It esti-
mates the probability of an object belonging to a given class
as the weighted proportion of its neighbors that belong to
that class and, then, the majority label is assigned after each
iteration.
Although related, there are several differences between
wvRN and McC-Splat : the later works on unweighted di-
rected graphs, labels are not assigned by majority vote but,
instead, weight vectors are propagated. Besides, in the ab-
sence of labeled neighbors wvRN assigns label on the basis
of the class priors –i.e. a random classifier– while McC-Splat
assigns the unknown class. Finally, the use of a sink node
and the estimation of weight vectors for the labeled exam-
ples to perform auto-thresholding are novel additions which
could be compared to cautious classification [12].
As it has been said, data mining users’ relationships in
OSNs raises some concerns and, in fact, this study have ex-
posed the privacy risks due to the public nature of those
relationships. Hence, this work has got some points of simi-
larity with a number of recent studies on privacy in OSNs.
It has been shown, for instance, that different kind of at-
tacks can be conducted on the basis of known relationships
and group memberships [18, 19], and a number of studies
have provided additional support for those findings in Face-
book –e.g. [6, 8].
It has been stated that privacy attacks can be successful
when “as much as half of the profiles are private” [18]. How-
ever, this study has revealed that the number of required
known users is, in fact, much lower –well below 1% for a
sample of 1.8 million users– and the achieved precision is
much higher than the one reported in [18]. Thereby, privacy
issues because of publicizing acquaintances in OSNs should
be a major concern for their users.
Finally, a few pertinent works on measures to improve
privacy in OSNs are referenced to provide context for the
protocol described in the last section.
At least two different Facebook applications relying on
public key cryptography to store obfuscated information in
the OSN servers have been proposed [9, 10]. By doing that
users can still make use of the OSN services but their per-
sonal information is decrypted on the client side and, thus,
10Weighted-vote Relational Network classifier.
Table 2: Performance of a random classifier based on the proportion of each class in the labeled data and
working on the same labeled data.
Attribute P=R=F1 Class P=R=F1
sex
Micro-avg. 0.5148 female 0.4139
Macro-avg. 0.5 male 0.5861
age
Micro-avg. 0.3116
teenage 0.3191
youngster 0.4180
Macro-avg. 0.2
young 0.1751
mid-age 0.0607
elder 0.0271
religious affiliation
Micro-avg. 0.7693
atheist 0.0356
budhist 0.0220
Macro-avg. 0.2
christian 0.8745
jewish 0.0494
muslim 0.0185
political orientation
Micro-avg. 0.8068 democrat 0.1084
Macro-avg. 0.5 republican 0.8916
sexual orientation
Micro-avg. 0.9798 heterosexual 0.0101
Macro-avg. 0.5 homosexual 0.9899
race/ethnicity
Micro-avg. 0.3586
asian-american 0.1706
black 0.5302
hispanic 0.0157
Macro-avg. 0.1667
native-american 0.2100
native-hawaiian 0.0105
white 0.0630
Table 3: Performance of a random classifier based on the proportion of each class in the labeled data and
working on the WeFollow dataset.
Attribute P R F1 Class P R F1
religious affiliation
Micro-avg. 0.6843
atheist 0.0872 0.0356 0.0506
budhist 0.0513 0.0220 0.0308
Macro-avg. 0.2
christian 0.7741 0.8745 0.8213
jewish 0.0484 0.0494 0.0489
muslim 0.0389 0.0185 0.0250
political orientation
Micro-avg. 0.7966 democrat 0.1213 0.1084 0.1145
Macro-avg. 0.5 republican 0.8787 0.8916 0.8851
sexual orientation
Micro-avg. 0.9899 heterosexual 0 1 0
Macro-avg. 0.5 0.9950 0.6655 homosexual 1 0.9899 0.9949
race/ethnicity
Micro-avg. 0.2119
asian-american 0.6022 0.1706 0.2659
black 0.1853 0.5302 0.2746
hispanic 0.1735 0.0157 0.0289
Macro-avg. 0.1667 0.4878 0.2484
native-american 0.0391 0.2100 0.0659
native-hawaiian 0 1 0
white 0 1 0
it is inaccessible for the OSN operator. Needless to say, en-
crypted text is relative easy to detect and, thus, a “hostile”
OSN operator could disable accounts using such a measure.
Because of that, it has been proposed to use instead a
dictionary known to the members of a group [3]. Such a dic-
tionary would provide a way to replace “atoms” of personal
information with atoms from other users. For instance, the
name, age, or sex of a user would be stored in such a way
that they still resemble personal information but cannot be
linked to the actual individual. By using the dictionary, the
group members could translate that fake information into
the actual attributes of their acquaintance. Purportedly, this
measure is much more difficult to detect than cryptography
and, thereby, it could be applied even when using the ser-
vices provided by “hostile” OSN operators [3].
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Implications for Users Privacy
Users sensitive information, such as political or religious
beliefs, race and ethnicity, or sexual orientation can be de-
termined with notable precision from their neighbors with
rather simple algorithms. Thereby, it does not matter if
users do not self-disclose personal traits, they can be in-
advertently exposed because of acquaintances who do not
conceal such information.
Most works on privacy in OSNs have mainly focused on
ways to guarantee that released datasets do not put at risk
the users’ privacy –e.g. [17]. Certainly, such anonymization
measures may dispel some concerns the operators of OSNs
can have about releasing data for research purposes. How-
ever, it is not at all necessary to obtain the data from the
operator of the OSN, but it is relatively easy to collect us-
ing the available APIs. Therefore, in spite of anonymization
methods, users of OSNs are fully exposed to any third party
aiming to data mine social graphs.
A trivial solution for that problem would be, of course, to
disable the APIs. This, however, is unlikely to happen be-
cause it would be contrary to the interests of the operators
of the OSNs. In addition to that, it would just make diffi-
cult11 for third parties to mine the users data but would not
prevent the operator of the OSN and licensed third parties
from doing it.
A number of works, some of them referenced in the pre-
vious section, propose users to encrypt the information they
submit to the system. Needless to say, making the users in-
formation opaque for the OSN would put at risk their current
business models which, to a great or lesser extent, revolve
around marketing and personalization. Thereby, it does not
seem unreasonable to assume that if encryption went main-
stream among OSN users, the operators of the services would
force users to use plain text.
5.2 Minimizing Data Mining Risks
So, to sum up, graph anonymization is an unreliable pas-
sive12 measure, and heavy use of cryptography, an active
user’s measure, could be easily disallowed by the operators
11Several ways in which an attacker can obtain information
on network relationships by compromising a number of user
accounts are described in [7].
12Passive, that is, from the point of view of the users.
of the OSNs. Hence, procedures to minimize privacy leak-
ages should be active and keep the use of cryptography to
a minimum; some hints on such a prophylactic protocol are
provided here.
First of all, the following protocol has been devised for
asymmetrical social networks in general, and Twitter in par-
ticular. Secondly, users are responsible for the information
they disclose on themselves; that is, the purpose of this pro-
tocol is not to protect their privacy regardless of their ac-
tions, but to minimize the likelihood of being exposed be-
cause of their relationships. In third place, users cannot
control who is following them but who they follow. It has
been shown that these relationships are risky and, thus, iden-
tifiable accounts cannot be used to follow anybody.
Needless to say, the network is useless if users are isolated
and, thereby, they need a mechanism to follow other users.
To that end, a second account is to be used. The nickname
should be a totally random string, and no information should
be provided other than a public key. This anonymous ac-
count –in contrast to the previous identified account– would
not be used to post messages other than mentions to fol-
lowees, and it would not accept followers.
Obviously, using two different accounts would be pointless
if they can be linked to each other by means of the IP ad-
dress. Therefore, the anonymous account should connect to
the service through an anonymizing service such as Tor13 or
I2P14 while this is not necessary for the identified account.
With regards to message publishing, those not mention-
ing any account or mentioning an identified account could
be published unencrypted. After all, users are responsible
for what they publish on themselves, and cannot control the
messages other users address to them. However, if the mes-
sage is a reply from an identified account to an anonymous
account it should be fully encrypted using the public key cor-
responding to the anonymous account. The reason for this
is to avoid eavesdroppers to find out implicit links starting
on identified accounts.
The most cumbersome part would be the one regarding
the exchange of credentials between anonymous and identi-
fied accounts. Such an exchange would be needed to allow
users to follow their followers. As it has been said, anony-
mous accounts are not for publishing messages and, thus,
they would be of no interest. However, after receiving a
new follower, that anonymous account is the only piece of
information the user has got to reach the follower’s identi-
fied account. Hence, the user receiving a new follower should
publish his or her public key encrypted with the public key of
the new follower. The follower would publish, in return, the
nickname for his or her identified account encrypted with the
public key of the followee. At that point, the followee could
use his anonymous account to start following the identified
account of his new follower.
Clearly, that chain of actions would allow an eavesdropper
to link anonymous and identified accounts. Thus, to avoid it,
the exchange of credentials could be made at pre-scheduled
hours. In addition to this, it must be clear that this pro-
tocol does not aim to maintain users anonymous from each
other but to conceal their relationships from third parties
observing the social network –including its operators.
13https://www.torproject.org/
14http://www.i2p2.de/
Finally, all of these measures should be implemented by
client software in such a way that the user could use the OSN
transparently.
5.3 Final Remarks and Future Work
A new algorithm to perform user profiling in social net-
works, McC-Splat, has been described. The new method
is related to other known algorithms but, unlike them, it
does not require ad hoc thresholds but, instead, it provides
a number of alternatives to perform auto thresholding from
the input labeled data.
A number of experiments were conducted to test its perfor-
mance. Results from those experiments have been reported,
revealing thatMcC-Splat largely outperforms a random clas-
sifier and, in fact, achieves a notably high precision for very
different classes and attributes. Nevertheless, further exper-
iments are needed to determine which of the different “fla-
vors” of the algorithm is the best choice, in addition to test
the algorithm on data from OSNs other than Twitter, and
labeled by different means.
The attributes employed for the experiments are usually
considered sensitive personal information and, thus, the ex-
periments had an additional outcome: exposing the risk that
acquaintances suppose for users which can be exposed even
without revealing any personal information on themselves.
Thereby, a prophylactic protocol to minimize leakages due
to graph data mining was outlined. Further work is needed
in this regard: a prototype implementation is highly needed;
in addition to field studies regarding its use by real users,
and analyzing its sensitiveness to different kind of attacks
–mainly those based on infiltration.
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Table 4: Performance figures for the six attributes and the four different“flavors”of the McC-Splat algorithm working on the Twitter dataset.
Details for each individual class are provided in addition to aggregated figures: both micro- and macro-averaged. Micro-averaged precision
is equivalent to the accuracy of the classifier for each attribute. Figures in bold correspond to “material” performance improvements against
the random classifier –i.e. larger than 10%, according to the criterion proposed by [16].
Attribute Class Plain-vanilla Sink-absolute Sink-relative Percentile
P R F1 P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
sex
female 0.6307 0.1091 0.186 0.6149 0.3135 0.4153 0.6125 0.3356 0.4337 0.6174 0.2432 0.3489
male 0.6039 0.8852 0.718 0.6803 0.4792 0.5623 0.6907 0.4679 0.5579 0.6765 0.3318 0.4452
Macro-avg. 0.6173 0.4972 0.5507 0.6476 0.3964 0.4917 0.6516 0.4018 0.497 0.6469 0.2875 0.3981
Micro-avg 0.606 0.564 0.5842 0.6582 0.4106 0.5057 0.6623 0.4132 0.5089 0.6551 0.2951 0.4069
age
teenage 0.533 0.1392 0.2207 0.5112 0.1636 0.2478 0.5398 0.175 0.2644 0.5989 0.1564 0.248
youngster 0.4438 0.8697 0.5877 0.5 0.2267 0.312 0.5375 0.1961 0.2873 0.5464 0.1742 0.2641
young 0.3607 0.0574 0.0991 0.2825 0.1305 0.1786 0.2458 0.1149 0.1566 0.2411 0.0705 0.1091
mid-age 0.3 0.0226 0.042 0.1441 0.1278 0.1355 0.135 0.1654 0.1486 0.1897 0.0827 0.1152
elder 0.5 0.0167 0.0323 0.0857 0.1 0.0923 0.0792 0.1333 0.0994 0.0476 0.0167 0.0247
Macro-avg. 0.4275 0.2211 0.2915 0.3047 0.1497 0.2008 0.3075 0.1569 0.2078 0.3247 0.1001 0.153
Micro-avg. 0.4486 0.4195 0.4336 0.3932 0.1802 0.2472 0.3743 0.1715 0.2353 0.4623 0.1404 0.2154
religious affiliation
atheist 1 0.2576 0.4096 0.4719 0.6364 0.5419 0.4699 0.5909 0.5235 0.6579 0.3788 0.4808
budhist 1 0.2195 0.36 0.6667 0.6341 0.65 0.4143 0.7073 0.5225 0.5769 0.3659 0.4478
christian 0.9174 0.9186 0.918 0.9899 0.7896 0.8785 0.9926 0.7409 0.8485 0.9928 0.768 0.8661
jewish 0.9592 0.5109 0.6667 0.6495 0.6848 0.6667 0.617 0.6304 0.6237 0.8154 0.5761 0.6752
muslim 1 0.4571 0.6275 0.8 0.6857 0.7385 0.2747 0.7143 0.3968 0.8571 0.5143 0.6429
Macro-avg. 0.9753 0.4727 0.6368 0.7156 0.6861 0.7005 0.5537 0.6768 0.6091 0.78 0.5206 0.6245
Micro-avg. 0.9207 0.8507 0.8843 0.927 0.7736 0.8434 0.8734 0.7288 0.7946 0.9658 0.731 0.8322
political orientation
democrat 1 0.26 0.4127 0.85 0.34 0.4857 0.6905 0.58 0.6304 0.7045 0.62 0.6596
republican 0.9157 0.9583 0.9365 0.944 0.9093 0.9263 0.973 0.8848 0.9268 0.9808 0.875 0.9249
Macro-avg. 0.9579 0.6092 0.7447 0.897 0.6247 0.7365 0.8318 0.7324 0.7789 0.8427 0.7475 0.7922
Micro-avg. 0.9182 0.8821 0.8998 0.9395 0.8472 0.8909 0.9443 0.8515 0.8955 0.951 0.8472 0.8961
sexual orientation
heterosexual 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
homosexual 0.9892 0.9418 0.9649 1 0.8116 0.896 1 0.8116 0.896 1 0.8116 0.896
Macro-avg. 0.9946 0.4709 0.6392 1 0.4058 0.5773 1 0.4058 0.5773 1 0.4058 0.5773
Micro-avg. 0.9892 0.9322 0.9599 1 0.8034 0.891 1 0.8034 0.891 1 0.8034 0.891
race/ethnicity
asian-american 0.8571 0.4615 0.6 0.8571 0.4615 0.6 0.75 0.4615 0.5714 0.8571 0.4615 0.6
black 0.9412 0.7805 0.8533 0.9412 0.7805 0.8533 0.9412 0.7805 0.8533 0.9412 0.7805 0.8533
hispanic 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
native-american 0.9231 0.75 0.8276 0.9231 0.75 0.8276 0.9167 0.6875 0.7857 0.9231 0.75 0.8276
native-hawaiian 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
white 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Macro-avg. 0.9536 0.332 0.4925 0.9536 0.332 0.4925 0.9347 0.3216 0.4785 0.9536 0.332 0.4925
Micro-avg. 0.9259 0.641 0.7576 0.9259 0.641 0.7576 0.9074 0.6282 0.7424 0.9259 0.641 0.7576
Table 5: Performance figures of the four “flavors” of the McC-Splat algorithm working on the WeFollow dataset. Bold figures correspond to
performance differences above 10% when comparing against the random classifier (see table 3).
Attribute Class Plain-vanilla Sink-absolute Sink-relative Percentile
P R F1 P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
religious affiliation
atheist 0.9795 0.1496 0.2595 0.8615 0.3117 0.4577 0.8355 0.3062 0.4481 0.8735 0.2326 0.3673
budhist 0.95 0.0759 0.1406 0.7349 0.1625 0.2661 0.5447 0.1864 0.2778 0.7034 0.1358 0.2277
christian 0.8705 0.3084 0.4555 0.9878 0.2643 0.417 0.9982 0.2411 0.3897 0.9983 0.2518 0.4021
jewish 0.9672 0.1664 0.284 0.6524 0.2144 0.3227 0.6329 0.2116 0.3171 0.768 0.1961 0.3124
muslim 0.973 0.0633 0.1188 0.6667 0.0984 0.1715 0.2331 0.109 0.1485 0.6849 0.0879 0.1558
Macro-avg. 0.948 0.1527 0.2631 0.7807 0.2103 0.3313 0.6489 0.2111 0.3185 0.8056 0.1808 0.2954
Micro-avg. 0.8799 0.2662 0.4088 0.9361 0.2543 0.4 0.8768 0.2382 0.3746 0.9566 0.2351 0.3774
political orientation
democrat 1 0.0478 0.0913 0.9429 0.0686 0.1279 0.7899 0.1954 0.3133 0.7638 0.2017 0.3191
republican 0.9178 0.3717 0.5291 0.9338 0.3602 0.5199 0.9778 0.3536 0.5194 0.9831 0.3502 0.5164
Macro-avg. 0.9589 0.2098 0.3442 0.9384 0.2144 0.349 0.8839 0.2745 0.4189 0.8735 0.276 0.4194
Micro-avg. 0.9191 0.3324 0.4882 0.934 0.3248 0.482 0.9616 0.3344 0.4963 0.9627 0.3322 0.4939
sexual orientation
heterosexual 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
homosexual 1 0.2685 0.4234 1 0.2415 0.389 1 0.2402 0.3874 1 0.2402 0.3874
Macro-avg. 1 0.6343 0.7762 1 0.6208 0.766 0.5 0.6201 0.5536 0.5 0.6201 0.5536
Micro-avg. 1 0.2685 0.4234 1 0.2415 0.389 0.9947 0.2402 0.387 0.9965 0.2402 0.3871
race/ethnicity
asian-american 0.8571 0.035 0.0672 0.8571 0.035 0.0672 0.8571 0.035 0.0672 0.8913 0.0341 0.0658
black 0.6818 0.1624 0.2623 0.6818 0.1624 0.2623 0.6919 0.161 0.2613 0.6722 0.1637 0.2633
hispanic 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
native-american 0.4828 0.0897 0.1514 0.4828 0.0897 0.1514 0.4375 0.0897 0.1489 0.4483 0.0833 0.1405
native-hawaiian 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
white 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Macro-avg. 0.5036 0.3812 0.4339 0.5036 0.3812 0.4339 0.4978 0.381 0.4316 0.502 0.3802 0.4327
Micro-avg. 0.7078 0.0547 0.1015 0.7078 0.0547 0.1015 0.7045 0.0544 0.101 0.7036 0.0541 0.1006
